CONTACT
Talk to Stipul
Stipul is a runtime authorization and audit platform for AI agent tool calls. It is being built for teams adopting agents that can change real systems. If you work on security, platform engineering, infrastructure, compliance, AI governance, or agentic workflows, I want to understand where runtime authorization and evidence would matter in your environment.
Reach out
Email [email protected] with context about your role, the systems your agents or automation can change, and where approval, denial, audit evidence, or tamper detection would matter.
Useful conversations
Security and platform teams
How are you controlling agentic tool calls today? Where do agents touch production, identity, infrastructure, billing, code, customer data, or admin surfaces?
Compliance and governance teams
What evidence would you need to trust or audit an agentic workflow? What would make an authorization record useful during review?
AI builders and operators
Where do agents currently hold credentials? How do you prevent tool misuse, prompt-injection-driven actions, or unsafe downstream calls?
Buyers and evaluators
What would Stipul need to prove before you would trust it as a control point between agents and systems they can change?
Questions worth answering
- Which systems can your agents or automations change today?
- Where do agents hold credentials, tokens, or API keys?
- What actions would require human approval before execution?
- What actions should be impossible for an agent to perform?
- How do you prove a denied action was not forwarded?
- What audit evidence do you currently collect for agentic workflows?
- Who owns policy for agent actions: security, platform, compliance, product, or engineering?
- What would make evidence trustworthy enough for an internal review, customer audit, or incident investigation?
- Which platform matters most first: Stripe, GitHub, Terraform, Microsoft Graph, Kubernetes, database, email, or something else?
- What would make Stipul feel deployable instead of theoretical?
- How would you detect if an agent bypassed the governed path and called an API directly?
Founder note
A short founder video will live here. It will explain why Stipul exists, what problem it is trying to solve, and why the product is focused on deterministic control, honest boundaries, and verifiable evidence.
Before reaching out
Stipul does not broadly secure AI agents. It controls mediated tool calls routed through Writ. It does not protect direct API access, leaked credentials used outside the governed workflow, compromised hosts, unmanaged SDK calls, or incorrectly written Charters.
Best-fit conversations
- You are deploying agents that can call real tools.
- You need authorization before business-critical actions execute.
- You need evidence that denied calls were not forwarded.
- You need tamper-evident records for audit or incident review.
- You are evaluating AI governance controls.
- You want to pressure-test Stipul's boundary, claims, or roadmap.
Send the workflow
The most useful message is not "tell me more." It is: "Here is the workflow we are worried about, here is the action we would want allowed, here is the action we would want denied, and here is the evidence we would need afterward."
Useful context:
- Platform or system involved
- Action that should be allowed
- Action that should be denied
- Who should approve high-risk actions
- Evidence needed after the workflow runs
- Current workaround or control