Microsoft Graph offboarding

Six tool calls. Four allowed. Two stopped.

A real agent performed a controlled offboarding workflow against Microsoft Entra. Routine account and group changes were permitted. Session revocation required operator approval. Permanent account deletion was prohibited.

Full narrated walkthrough will be added after recording.

1. Real model runtime
1. Real model runtime Real model execution. The workflow uses a deployed GPT-5 mini model in Microsoft Foundry rather than a fabricated agent transcript.
2. Account enabled before execution
2. Account enabled before execution Live starting state. The demonstration account begins enabled in Microsoft Entra before the agent runs.
3. Engineering membership before execution
3. Engineering membership before execution Existing access. Omar begins as a direct member of the Engineering group, creating a real downstream state for the offboarding workflow to change.
4. Powerful Graph permissions
4. Powerful Graph permissions Meaningful authority. The application can change users, groups, and sessions through Microsoft Graph. Stipul adds contextual authorization before those capabilities execute.
5. Charter tool boundary
5. Charter tool boundary Authorization is defined before execution. The Charter exposes specific offboarding tools while placing permanent account deletion under never_allow_tools.
6. Approval required
6. Approval required Operator control for irreversible action. Session revocation is classified as irreversible and requires an approval quorum.

Final run

The final session recorded six tool calls: four allowed and two denied. Session revocation stopped because approval was required. Permanent deletion stopped because the Charter prohibited it.

Stipul governs only calls routed through Writ. Direct API access, unmanaged tools, leaked credentials, compromised hosts, and bypass paths remain outside this demonstration's control boundary.